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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts for information acquisition and
revelation. A decision maker faces the problem to design a contract that provides
an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in
general not optimal to reward the expert if his recommendation is conﬁrmed. The
common observation that experts are paid when their recommendation is conﬁrmed
can be explained by incomplete information about the expert’s cost to increase the
precision of his information. We extend the model to analyze contracting with
multiple experts, the timing of expertise, and the provision of incentives when the
realized state is not veriﬁable.
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It is a common feature of economic problems that actions have to be taken before the exact
circumstances that determine the outcome are known. In many situations, there are potentially
huge costs of a mismatch between action and the state that is realized after the action has been
taken. In these situations, the decision maker would beneﬁt from access to better information.
Even when it is impossible to completely resolve the uncertainty about the future, in many sit-
uations players can acquire additional information besides what is publicly available. Acquiring
information is costly and it is not necessarily the decision maker who has the lowest cost. In many
professions exist experts who specialize in forecasting, presumably because they have access to a
more eﬃcient technology to acquire information or due to economies of scale. The best known
examples of forecasts are probably weather forecasts and predictions of macroeconomic variables.
Besides that, there exists a variety of ﬁnancial forecasts, estimates about the demand for new
products or the cost of new technologies, predictions of the outcome of elections, the eﬀect of tax
reforms, etc. In these examples, the one who initiates the forecast and whose decision is based on
the forecast, is usually not the one who acquires the information. But if information acquisition
is delegated to experts, the problem arises how to align the incentives for information acquisition
and for truthful information revelation.
We study optimal incentive contracts for information acquisition and revelation. This paper
contributes to a growing literature that concentrates on asymmetries in the cost of acquiring infor-
mation rather than on asymmetric information. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following situation:
A decision maker has to take some action before the state of the world is realized. The better the
action matches the state, the higher is the decision maker’s payoﬀ. Instead of basing the choice of
the action solely on the common prior, the decision maker can contract with an expert to gather
additional information. The decision maker (principal) faces the problem to design a contract
that provides the expert (agent) with incentives to increase the precision of his information and
1to reveal the information.
When eﬀort is not observable, incentives for information acquisition can only be provided if the
agent’s compensation depends on some variable that is correlated with the realized state and on
the report of the agent. Under complete information, a report is equivalent to a recommendation
to implement a certain action. We show that it is in general not optimal to reward the agent when
his recommendation is conﬁrmed by the facts. Under the optimal contract, the agent is (at least
sometimes) rewarded when his recommendation turns out to be wrong but is not rewarded when
the recommendation was correct. The optimal action and, if the agent reveals his information, the
recommendation are functions of the agent’s posterior. In general, a recommendation is conﬁrmed
if the realized state is equal to the agent’s posterior mean. When the agent’s information has the
form of a signal and signal and state are normally distributed, the agent is not rewarded when
the recommendation is conﬁrmed and the state is equal to the agent’s posterior mean but instead
if the state is equal to the signal.
The observation that in reality many experts are rewarded if their recommendations are con-
ﬁrmed can be explained by incomplete information about the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort. When
the principal knows the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort, for a given contract, she can compute the
equilibrium precision of the agent’s signal. In this case, the revelation of the agent’s private in-
formation is equivalent to the recommendation of an action. Under incomplete information about
the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort, a recommendation contains more information than the revelation
of the private information of the agent. On the other hand, if the agent recommends an action and
is rewarded if the recommendation is conﬁrmed, he has less incentives to increase the precision of
his signal. When there is a lot of uncertainty about the cost to exert eﬀort, the ﬁrst eﬀect (more
information) dominates the second (less incentives).
We use the results about optimal incentive contracts to analyze the organization of expertise.
The optimal number of agents depends on the cost of information acquisition. Only if the marginal
cost of precision increases, it is optimal to contract with as many agents as possible. In many
2situations, it is possible to gather information either sequentially or simultaneously. We show that
regardless of the cost function, the timing of expertise does not aﬀect the payoﬀs and, therefore,
does not aﬀect the equilibrium amount of information that is acquired. Finally, we analyze the
optimal contract when the realized state is not observable or not veriﬁable. In this case, the
principal contracts with two agents and the wage depends on the reports of both agents. Similar
t ot h ec a s ew h e r et h es t a t ei so b s e r v a b l e ,a n agent is not rewarded if his report is conﬁrmed by
the other agent. Instead, an agent is rewarded if the other agent reports a signal which is more
extreme.
There exists an extensive literature that analyzes and tests diﬀerent theories about the behavior
of forecasters1 . While these papers are interested in information revelation, they do not model
the decision to acquire information and do not consider the design of incentive contracts.
Ottaviani and Sørensen analyze the strategic behavior of forecasters who are endowed with a
signal. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003) analyze a situation where forecasters compete in a rank-
order contest where prizes are exogenously determined. In the presence of prior information,
forecasts are excessively diﬀerentiated in the sense that the posterior mean lies between the prior
mean and the forecast. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2004) model forecasting as a reputational cheap-
talk game. Similar to Ottaviani and Sørensen, Krishna and Morgan (2001) do not consider
information acquisition or the design of incentive contracts. They analyze strategic information
revelation of biased experts who are perfectly informed about the true state.
Similar to this paper, Osband (1989) is interested in the optimal contract when the principal
observes neither the agent’s information nor the eﬀort that determines the precision of the infor-
mation. His setting diﬀers in that he assumes that the agent is not wealth-constrained. Therefore,
it is optimal to sell the project to the agent.2 Prendergast (1993) analyzes information acquisition
when there is no obvious metric to measure the accuracy of the forecast. The agent receives two
1 E.g., Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996), Hong et al. (2000), Lamont (2002), Laster et al. (1999).
2 When the principal knows the type of agent (i.e., the agent’s cost of eﬀort) she sells the project to the agent.
Under incomplete information, the principal sells only a fraction of the project to reduce information rents.
3signals. The ﬁrst signal is correlated with the state and the second is correlated with the opinion
of the principal. To provide the agent with incentives to exert eﬀort, the wage has to be tied to
the principal’s opinion. Prendergast shows that the agent’s report is biased towards the agent’s
belief about the opinion of the principal. As a result, the principal cannot infer the signals. If the
agent’s desire to conform with the principal’s opinion is large, the gain from an unbiased report
outweighs the loss from lower precision. In this case, the principal does not oﬀer an incentive
contract but instead pays a ﬁxed wage to guarantee truthtelling.
In a diﬀerent context, several authors analyze incentives for information acquisition in pro-
curement settings. Crémer and Khalil (1992), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998), and Lewis and
Sappington (1999) analyze how to deter an agent from acquiring information that generates rents
but has no social value. Lewis and Sappington (1997) consider a situation where the principal
wants the agent not only to acquire but also to reveal information that is socially valuable. The
principal optimally oﬀers a reward schedule with ’super-high-powered’ incentives when costs are
low and a high degree of cost-sharing when costs are high.
Li (2001) and Szalay (2003) examine information acquisition when players have the same
preferences over the implementation of actions and when it is not possible to design monetary
incentives. Li assumes that the action space is binary and that players receive a signal about the
true state where the precision of the signal is increasing in eﬀort. Li shows that commitment to
excessive conservatism in the decision-making of committees can be used to increase the incentives
to acquire information. Szalay considers a situation where the action space is continuous and
assumes that the probability to learn the state is increasing in eﬀort. In a principal-agent setting,
Szalay shows that the principal ﬁnds it optimal to let the agent choose the action but excludes
actions from the choice set, which are optimal when no information is acquired. In both papers,
the commitment to ex-post ineﬃciencies in the choice of the action is used to mitigate the ex-ante
problem to create incentives for the acquisition of information.
Gromb and Martimort (2003) study the implications of optimal incentive contracts for the
4organizational design of expertise. There are two possible states: a project is either proﬁtable or
not. The agent can draw independent binary signals at a ﬁxed cost per signal. After receiving the
signals, the agent recommends to either undertake the project or not. Gromb and Martimort state
a ’Principle of Incentives for Expertise’: It is optimal to reward the agent if his recommendation
is conﬁrmed. We show that this Principle does not necessarily hold when the state and signal
space are continuous.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the optimal
contract when the principal knows the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort. Section 4 discusses the eﬀect of
uncertainty about the agent’s cost on the optimal contract. Section 5 examines situations where
the principal can contract with multiple agents. We analyze the optimal number of agents and
show that the equilibrium payoﬀs and precision do not change when agents acquire information
sequentially instead of simultaneously. We also analyze how to provide incentives to acquire
information when the agent has to be paid before the state of the world is realized or if the state
is not veriﬁable. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a principal whose expected payoﬀ depends on the precision of her estimate about the
realization of some random variable. The principal has to take some action a before the future
state of the world is realized. The principal’s payoﬀ is decreasing in the distance between the
action and the realized state x where x,a ∈ R.L e tl denote the loss function that describes the
payoﬀ and let V = −E [l(|a − x|)] denote the expected loss with l0 > 0.
There exists a common prior that the future state x is distributed normally with mean µ





. The agent has access to a technology that generates
information about the future state of the world. When the agent exerts eﬀort, he draws a signal






. The precision τ of the signal depends on how much eﬀort the agent exerts. The
disutility of the eﬀort that is necessary to generate a signal with precision τ is given by c(τ) where
c is continuously diﬀerentiable with c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0, c0(τ) > 0 for all τ>0,a n dc00 ≥ 0.
The principal observes neither the signal nor the precision. To improve the precision of her
estimate about the future state, the principal can oﬀer a contract to the agent. The agent can
costlessy send a message m ∈ R. While signal and precision are not observed by the principal,
we assume that the message, the action, and the realized state are veriﬁable. Let E[w] be the
expected wage payment. The expected payoﬀ of the principal is V −E[w]. The payoﬀ of the agent
depends on the wage w and the disutility of eﬀort. To isolate the problem to create incentives for
information acquisition and revelation from the eﬀects of risk-aversion, we assume that the agent
is risk-neutral and has zero liability. If the agent accepts the contract, his payoﬀ is w − c(τ).I f
the agent rejects the contract, he receives a payoﬀ of zero.
The timing is as follows: The principal oﬀers a contract. The agent accepts or rejects. If he
accepts, he exerts eﬀort and draws a signal with the corresponding precision. After observing the
signal, the agent sends a message. Given the message, the principal updates her belief about the
future state and chooses an action. Finally, the state is realized, the wage is paid, and payoﬀsa r e
realized.
After the principal receives the message, she updates her beliefs about the distribution of x and
chooses an action to minimize the expected loss. Choosing an action is equivalent to computing
the appropriate estimator where the estimator minimizes the expected value of the error function
l (i.e., of the loss function). The error of the estimator and, therefore, the expected payoﬀ of
the principal, depend not only on the precision of the signal but also on how much information
the message reveals about the signal. For any non-trivial mapping from signals to messages, the
expected payoﬀ of the principal is increasing in the precision of the signal. Similarly, for any
precision τ>0, the expected payoﬀ of the principal increases if the measures of all sets of signals,
which induce the same message, decrease. If the contract induces a one-to-one mapping from
6signals to messages, the principal learns the signal and her posterior can be described by a normal
distribution.
Lemma 1 When the principal learns the signal and the precision, she chooses the action equal
to her posterior mean.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Given that the message reveals the signal, let ∂V
∂τ be the marginal change of the expected loss
from a mismatch between action and state with respect to the precision of the signal.
Benchmark: The First-Best Solution
Suppose the principal can observe τ and s or can sell the project to a risk-neutral agent with
unlimited liability. In this case, in equilibrium, a =
τ∗∗s+νµ
τ∗∗+ν , the agent exerts the ﬁrst-best eﬀort,




When the precision of the signal is not observable and the agent is either wealth constrained
or risk-averse, implementation of the ﬁr s tb e s te ﬀort is not optimal. In this case, the principal
faces the problem to design a contract that provides the agent with incentives to exert eﬀort and
to reveal his information.
3. The Optimal Contract
Since signal and eﬀort are not observed by the principal, the wage can only be conditioned
on the message, the action, and the realized state. If the wage depends only on the message or
only on the state, the agent has no incentive to exert eﬀort. Since ν<∞,a d d i t i o n a li n f o r m a t i o n
about the future state is valuable for principal. The assumptions on c imply that at τ =0 ,t h e
7marginal cost to provide the agent with incentives to exert eﬀort is zero. Therefore, it cannot be
optimal to oﬀer a contract where the wage depends only on the message or only on the state.
On the other hand, contracts where the wage depends on the action are feasible, but not opti-
mal. Since the agent’s payoﬀ does not directly depend on the action, it is not possible to provide
additional incentives to exert eﬀort by making the wage dependent on the action. Additionally, if
the wage depends in a non-trivial way on the action, the choice of the action is distorted, because
the principal takes into account how the action aﬀects the wage. Therefore, under the optimal
contract, the wage is a function of message and state only.
We derive the optimal contract in two steps. Initially, we suppress the question whether
signals are revealed and characterize the contract that maximizes the incentive to exert eﬀort for
an arbitrary expected wage payment. Using the result that under these contracts the message
reveals the signal, we compute the optimal precision that the principal implements.
Given a signal s with precision τ, the agent’s conditional expectation is E[x|s,τ]=
τs+νµ
τ+ν .













(x − E[x])2(τ + ν)
ª
.
Let w(m,x) denote the agent’s wage if he sends message m and the realized state is x.G i v e nw,





Let m∗(s,τ) be the message that maximizes p(m,s,τ). We suspend the proof that m∗ is unique
until Proposition 1.
Before the agent observes a signal, he chooses eﬀort to maximize his payoﬀ
ZZ
w(m∗,x)q(x|s,τ)dxf(s,τ)ds − c(τ) (2)
where f(s,τ) denotes the unconditional density of the signal as a function of the eﬀort. Since
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Let τ∗ be the precision that maximizes the agent’s payoﬀ.T h e ﬁrst order condition that






















where w is evaluated at m∗.S i n c em∗ is the message that maximizes the agent’s payoﬀ,
∂p(m,s,τ)









w(m∗,x)q(x|s,τ∗)dxf(s,τ∗)ds = c0(τ∗) (4)
where the LHS of eqn.(4) is the marginal increase of the expected wage if the precision of his
signal increases.




where second term is the expected payment to the agent. The contract speciﬁes a non-negative
wage for every message and for every realized state.
If the optimal contract induces the agent to reveal his signal, it follows from the revelation
principle that it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to contracts where m∗(s)=s and the agent
announces his signal. If signals are revealed, maximizing the payoﬀ of the principal is equivalent
to maximizing the incentive to increase the precision subject to the constraint that wages are
non-negative, that the agent reveals the signal, and that the expected wage payment is less or
equal to some optimally chosen constant.
The incentive to increase the precision is the marginal eﬀect of precision on the expected
wage and is equal to the LHS of eqn.(4). Since m∗(s)=s, the expected wage E[w] is equal
9to
RR
w(s,x)q(x|s,τ∗)dxf(s,τ∗)ds. For any E[w] > 0, a necessary condition for the LHS of
eqn.(4) to be maximal is that w(s,x)=0for x 6= s and that w(s,s) > 0 for some s. Hence, the
principal pays a positive wage only if the realized state is equal to the signal. Using the result




w(s,s)q(s|s,τ∗)dxf(s,τ∗)ds = c0(τ∗) (5)













where K is a constant that is chosen by the principal.
Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium.3





if m = x
w(m,x)=0 otherwise
(i) The agent accepts and sends message m(s)=s.






and chooses action a =
τ∗m+νµ
τ∗+ν .
(iii) The equilibrium precision τ∗ is deﬁned by ∂V
∂τ =2 c0(τ∗)+2 τ∗c00(τ∗).
(iv) In equilibrium, E[w]=2 τ∗c0(τ∗). The expected equilibrium payoﬀ of the agent is 2τ∗c0(τ∗)−
c(τ∗) and the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of the principal is V (τ∗) − 2τ∗c0(τ∗).
3 The assumption that state and signal are normally distributed simpliﬁes the analysis and allows to compute
explicit solutions but complicates the interpretation of the results. The probability that the state is equal to
the signal is zero. Since the support of the normal distribution is unbounded, the wage is unbounded. Since
w(s,s)q(s|s,τ)f(s,τ) is constant, for 0 <k<∞, the expected wage is positive and ﬁnite although the wage is paid
with probability zero. The technical reason for this zero-probability result is that at the optimum, the principal
rewards the agent if the state lies in the smallest interval that is centered aroud the signal. Therefore, equilibrium
existence requires that the agent is rewarded only if x = s, which occurs with probability zero. On the other hand,
it is impossible to measure the realization of a continuous variable (e.g., GDP) with inﬁnite accuracy. Proposition
1 should be interpreted as the wage being positive if the state lies in some small interval that is centered around
the message.
10One advantage of the model is that it allows to compute explicit expressions for the equilibrium
precision and the equilibrium payoﬀs.








to guarantee an interior solution.)
At the equilibrium, ∂V
∂τ =2 c0(τ∗)+2 τ∗c00(τ∗).F r o m∂V
∂τ = 1




2 − ν. From eqn.(6) and the equilibrium condition that
∂E[w]
∂τ = c0(τ∗) at τ∗ follows that
the expected wage is E[w]=
√
2 − 2ν. The expected payoﬀ of the principal is −2
√
2+2 ν,a n d




Gromb and Martimort (2003) consider an agent who can pay a ﬁxed cost to draw a binary
signal. There are two states: a project is either proﬁtable or not. The agent recommends to either
undertake the project or not. Gromb and Martimort state a ’Principle of Incentives for Expertise’:
It is optimal to reward the agent if his recommendation is conﬁr m e d( e i t h e rb yt h ef a c t so rb yt h e
recommendation of another expert).
Similar to the setting of Gromb and Martimort, in the model above, the agent is indiﬀerent
towards which action is chosen. The contract in Proposition 1 is equivalent to a contract where
the agent recommends to choose the action
τs+νµ
τ+ν and the principal uses the recommendation
to compute the agent’s signal and pays the same wages as in Proposition 1. Contrary to the
binary setting of Gromb and Martimort, their ’Principle of Incentives for Expertise’ does not
hold in the continuous environment that is considered here. Contrary to common intuition, this
paper shows that it is in general not optimal to reward the agent when his recommendation is
conﬁrmed. Speciﬁcally, under the optimal contract, the agent is rewarded (at least sometimes)
when his recommendation is wrong but not rewarded when his recommendation is conﬁrmed.
The principal faces two problems: To design a contract and to choose the action that maximizes
her expected payoﬀ. The objective in the ﬁrst problem is to maximize the agent’s incentive to
11exert eﬀort and to ensure that the agent reveals his information. The objective in the second
problem is to maximize the expected payoﬀ after the agent has revealed his private information.
To provide the agent with incentives to exert eﬀort, the wage has to depend on the realized state
and the message (i.e., the recommendation). However, there is no reason why the wage should be
tied to the question how well the recommendation matches the state.
In the model above, the recommendation of an action is equivalent to the announcement of
the posterior mean and the recommendation is conﬁrmed if it is equal to the realized state.4
To see why it is not optimal to reward the agent if his recommendation is conﬁrmed, ﬁxa n
arbitrary signal s.G i v e ns, from the perspective of the agent, an increase of the precision implies










. The principal chooses when to reward the agent. Hence, the principal maximizes
the RHS of eqn.(3) with respect to x. It is optimal to reward the agent when the relative eﬀect of
an increase of the precision on the likelihood that a certain state is realized, is maximal. Therefore,
if the agent observes (and reveals) s, it is optimal to reward him when the realized state is equal




q(x|s,τ). Note that eqn.(3) makes no use of the assumption that
state and signal are normally distributed. In the special case where state and signal are normally




q(x|s,τ) and it is optimal to reward the agent when
the state is equal to the signal.
In the following paragraphs, we summarize a few results which follow from Proposition 1. Not
only are signals revealed under the optimal contract, but the equilibrium precision and expected
wage payment are the same as when the signal is veriﬁable.
Result 1 The principal implements the same eﬀort level regardless whether the signal is veri-
ﬁable or not.
4 More general, the optimal action and, therefore, the recommendation, are functions of the posterior mean and
a recommendation is conﬁrmed if the realized state is equal to the agent’s posterior mean.
12The optimal contract in Proposition 1 is derived for the case where the signal is not observable.
Result 1 shows that the analysis applies not only to the case where information is soft (i.e., where
the signal is not observed or is not veriﬁable) but also to the case where information is hard and
the agent’s signal can be veriﬁed. In both cases, the contract described in Proposition 1 is optimal.
The Precision of the Prior
The wage is convex in the message with a minimum at m = µ. This is the consequence of the
result that it is optimal to reward the agent only if the realized state is equal to the signal. Since
q(s|s,τ) decreases in |s − µ|, the larger the distance between signal and prior mean, the smaller
is the likelihood that the state is equal to the signal. To ensure that the agent reveals the signal,
the wage has to be convex. The diﬀerence between posterior mean and prior mean depends on
signal and precision. If the prior is very precise, the agent expects (before he draws the signal)
that his posterior mean is fairly close to the prior mean. Therefore, the probability that the state
is equal to the signal decreases faster in the distance between signal and prior mean, if the prior
is more precise. This is the reason that the convexity of the wage increases when the precision of
the prior increases.
Result 2 The convexity of the wage is increasing in the precision of the prior: w00
w0 increases
(decreases) in ν for m>µ(m<µ ).
When the precision of the prior is high, the agent has a fairly good idea about the future state
even if he exerts no eﬀort. Intuitively, one would expect that this makes it more costly to induce
the agent to exert eﬀort when the precision of the prior is high.5 It turns out that this intuition
is wrong. Under the optimal contract, the incentive to exert eﬀort depends only on the expected
wage E[w].I fν increases, the optimal contract changes as the wage becomes more convex, while
the equilibrium eﬀort of the agent does not change as long as E[w] does not change.
5 For the simple (suboptimal) contract where the agent is rewarded if his recommendation is correct, it is
straightforward to show that it is more costly to induce eﬀort for higher values of ν. In this case, the marginal
incentive to exert eﬀort is 1
2(τ+ν)E[w] which is decreasing in ν.
13Result 3 The expected wage that is necessary to implement a given eﬀort does not depend on
the precision of the prior.
Of course, if the precision of the prior increases, the marginal value of the precision of the
agent’s signal decreases. Therefore, the principal implements a lower eﬀort level if the precision
of the prior is high.
Compared to a signal that is close to the prior mean, extreme signals contain more information.
More extreme signals trigger a larger change in the action that the principal chooses compared to
the action that would have been chosen if no signal were observed. In this sense, extreme signals
are more valuable for the principal. On the other hand, the observation of an extreme signal is
good news for the agent since the expected wage payment is increasing in the distance between
signal and prior mean. However, the fact that the expected wage for extreme signals is higher has
nothing to do with the fact that extreme signals are more valuable for the principal. The only
reason for the higher wage is to ensure that the agent reveals the signal.
4. Incomplete Information
Proposition 1 shows that it is optimal to reward the agent if the state is equal to the signal.
This seems to contradict the observation that many experts are rewarded if their recommendation
is conﬁrmed by the facts. We show in this section that incomplete information about the agent’s
cost to exert eﬀort oﬀers an explanation for this observation.6
In the model above, the optimal action coincides with the posterior mean. This coincidence is
a result of the assumptions on the loss function but does not restrict the generality of model. The
6 There are other explanations. If the agent is risk-averse, it is optimal to reward the agent if the state lies in
an interval that is centered around a value between
τs+νµ
τ+ν and s (and might include
τs+νµ
τ+ν ). Since q(s|s,τ) is
decreasing in |s − µ|, it gets increasingly costly to reward the agent when the interval is centered around s.
14recommendation of an optimal action is equivalent to the revelation of the agent’s posterior mean.
A recommendation of the agent is conﬁrmed by the facts if the realized state coincides with the
recommended action.
The optimal contract in Proposition 1 is derived under the assumption that the principal knows
the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort. The contract in Proposition 1 is equivalent to a contract where
w(e s,x)=kexp
©1
2νe s2 − νe sµ
ª
if e s = x and w(e s,x)=0otherwise where e s =
m(τ+ν)−νµ
τ .T h e
agent ’recommends an action’ by sending a message that is equal to his posterior: m(s)=
τs+νµ
τ+ν .
The principal follows the recommendation and implements a = m.
When the principal does not know the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort, the revelation of the signal is
no longer equivalent to the revelation of the posterior. Agents with diﬀerent costs, exert diﬀerent
eﬀort levels and receive signals with diﬀerent precision. In this case, the principal does not know
the precision of the signal which underlies the agent’s report. If the principal learns the signal but
does not know the precision of the signal, she cannot compute the eﬃcient action.
On other hand, the principal can design a contract such that the agent recommends the eﬃcient
action regardless of the precision of his signal. The optimal contract that ensures that the agent
always recommends the eﬃcient action can be written as: w(m,x)=k if m = x and w(m,x)=0
if m 6= x. Under this contract, the agent sends the message m(s)=
τs+νµ
τ+ν . The agent is
rewarded if and only if his recommendation is conﬁrmed by the facts and the principal follows the
recommendation. To avoid confusion, from now on, the term ’contract where agent recommends
an action’ refers to a contract where the agent recommends the eﬃcient action regardless of the
precision of his signal.
The incentive to exert eﬀort is maximal if the agent is rewarded only if x = s.B u t i f t h e
principal does not know the cost to exert eﬀort and the agent recommends an action, the principal
does not learn the signal and it is not possible to reward the agent only if x = s.
Under some conditions, this problem has a simple solution: The principal asks the agent to
make two reports. The ﬁrst report reveals the signal, the second reveals the precision of the
15signal, and wages are the same as in Proposition 1. Since the wage is independent of the reported
precision, the agent has no incentive to misreport the precision and there is no eﬃciency loss
through incomplete information.
The separation of types can be costly and is not always possible. Consider the case where the
cost to exert eﬀort is either high or low. The simple solution where the agent sends two reports
does not work if the beneﬁt for the high cost type if he is seen as the low cost type is larger
than the loss for the low type if he is seen as the high type.7 In this case, the principal faces
at r a d e - o ﬀ: A contract where the agent is rewarded if the state is equal to the signal maximizes
the incentive to increase the precision of the signal. But for a given precision, it is optimal if the
agent recommends an action because only this guarantees that the principal learns all relevant
information.
For a given contract, let τl and τh be the lowest and the highest precision that diﬀerent types
of the agent choose. If the contract asks the agent to recommend an action, a type i agent
recommends E[x|s,τi], the principal follows the recommendation and, therefore, implements the
optimal action. If the principal oﬀers a contract under which she learns the signal but not the
precision, the action that the principal chooses lies between E[x|s,τl] and E[x|s,τh].8 Except
for possibly one type j,f o rw h oE[x|s,τj] equals the action, the principal does not implement
the optimal action. Contrary to the posterior mean E[x|s,τi], the signal s does not contain all
information that is relevant for the principal. Therefore, for a given precision, the payoﬀ of the
principal is maximal when the agent is asked to recommend an action (Information Eﬀect).
On the other hand, if the agent only recommends an action (i.e., reports his posterior mean),
the principal cannot infer the signal and it is not possible to reward the agent when the state is
equal to the signal. Instead, the agent is rewarded if the recommendation is conﬁrmed, i.e., if the
7 There exists an extensive literature that discusses career concerns and reputation building as reasons for the
beneﬁt or loss from being perceived as a certain type (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Hong et al. (2000)).
8 The density function f that describes the unconditional distribution of s is a function of τ. When the agent
reports a signal, the principal updates her beliefs over the type of the agent. The action that the principal chooses
depends on the loss function and on the updated belief over the type of the agent.
16state is equal to E[x|s,τi]. In this case, at the equilibrium precision τ∗ holds 1
2(τ∗+ν)E[w]=c0(τ∗).
Comparison with eqn.(5) reveals that the equilibrium precision is lower when the agent is rewarded
if his recommendation is correct (Incentive Eﬀect).
Suppose that the principal does not know the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort and that it is not
possible to separate the types. Under incomplete information, neither the contract in Proposition
1 where the agent reveals the signal regardless of his precision nor the contract where the agent
reveals the posterior regardless of his precision is optimal. Instead, under the optimal contract,
the agent is rewarded if the realized state is equal to some value which lies between the agent’s
posterior and the signal.
The ﬁrst step to ﬁnd the optimal contract is to determine for which realized state the agent
gets rewarded. Wlog. let the message be such that the agent gets rewarded if and only if the
message is equal to the realized state. If m = E[x|s,τ], the principal chooses a = m.I f t h e
message is marginally larger or smaller than E[x|s,τ], the principal does not learn which action
is eﬃcient. However, since ∂V
∂a =0at a = E[x|s,τ], the principal incurs only a second-order loss
if the message diﬀers marginally from E[x|s,τ].9









∂m < 0 for m<µ ). Recall that
∂E[w]
∂τ is the incentive to exert eﬀort. Hence, at
m = E[x|s,τ], changing the contract such that the message is marginally closer to s results in a
ﬁrst-order increase in the incentive to exert eﬀort.
Similar, at m = s, changing the contract such that m is marginally closer to E[x|s,τ] results
in a second-order decrease in the incentive to exert eﬀort but in a ﬁrst-order gain from a more
eﬃcient action.
















E[x|s,τi]. From the perspective of the principal, the message is equal to the posterior plus noise (because the




w(m,m), the smaller is the




w(m,m), the smaller is the expected diﬀerence between the action that
t h ep r i n c i p a lc h o o s e sa n dt h ee ﬃcient action.
17Therefore, under the optimal contract, the agent sends a message that lies between E[x|s,τi]
and s and the agent is rewarded if the realized state is equal to the message.
Suppose that the agent’s cost to exert eﬀort is either high or low. If the diﬀerence between high
and low costs is large, the diﬀerence between equilibrium precisions τ∗
l and τ∗
h is large. Consider a
contract as in Proposition 1 where the principal learns only the signal. If the diﬀerence between τ∗
l
and τ∗








h+ν is large and the information




i +ν is large. If the
diﬀerence between τ∗
l and τ∗
h is large enough, the Information Eﬀect dominates the Incentive
Eﬀect. In this case, under the optimal contract, the agent is rewarded if the realized state is close
to the posterior mean E[x|s,τ]. If the diﬀerence between the equilibrium precisions is small, the
Incentive Eﬀect dominates. In this case, the agent is rewarded if the realized state is close to his
signal.
The probability distribution over the types of the agent also aﬀects the design of the optimal
contract. If there is little uncertainty over the cost of the agent, the Incentive Eﬀect dominates
the Information Eﬀect. Suppose that the probability that the agent has high costs is close to




h+ν . With high
probability, the principal’s action is close to the eﬃcient action and only with small probability,
t h e r ei sal a r g ed i ﬀerence between the principal’s action and the eﬃcient action. Therefore, if the
probability that the agent has high costs is either large enough or small enough, the Incentive
Eﬀect dominates the Information Eﬀect. In this case, the agent is rewarded if the realized state
is close to his signal.
5. Multiple Experts, the Timing of Expertise, and Non-Veriﬁable States
Decision makers routinely seek the advice of more than one expert. Especially in the public
policy area, it is common that several experts comment on projects. Duplication of expertise
18is usually justiﬁed with beneﬁts from including diﬀerent points of view in the decision making
process. Several authors examine situations where a principal can contract with several experts to
acquire information. Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) analyze the optimal strategy of a principal
who has to rely on experts to identify the correct type of service that is needed. The principal
samples experts until he receives two matching recommendations. Krishna and Morgan (2001)
ﬁnd that a principal, who faces biased experts, beneﬁts from consulting two experts if the biases
are opposed. In a binary model, Gromb and Martimort (2003) show that agency costs exhibit
diseconomies of scale and that contracting with multiple experts reduces costs. Contrary to Gromb
and Martimort, we show that in the continuous model that is discussed above, agency costs do
not exhibit diseconomies of scale (at least if the marginal cost of precision is constant as assumed
by Gromb and Martimort).
With respect to the organization of expertise, we are interested in two questions: What is
the optimal number of agents with who the principal contracts and what is the optimal timing
of expertise. We consider two diﬀerent timings. Under ’simultaneous expertise’, agents acquire
information simultaneously and agents cannot communicate with each other before they send a
message to the principal. The assumption that communication is impossible rules out collusion.
Under ’sequential expertise’, agents acquire information sequentially and agents observe earlier
messages and contracts.
Suppose there is a pool of N<∞ identical agents. Let i denote an arbitrary agent with
whom the principal contracts and let τ∗





∂τ be the derivative with respect to τ∗.L e t n∗ be the equilibrium number of
agents who contract with the principal.10
Proposition 2 (i) If signals are conditionally independent, n∗ =1if c00 < 0, n∗ = N
if c00 > 0,a n dn∗ =1 ,2,.. N if c00 =0 . The equilibrium precision τ∗ is deﬁned by ∂V
∂τ =
10 In the model above, we assumed that c00 ≥ 0 to ensure that there exists a unique precision that maximizes the












.I fc00 6=0 , τ∗
i = τ∗
n∗.I fc00 =0 ,
P
τ∗
i = τ∗ and τ∗
i ≥ 0 for all i.I n
equilibrium, E[wi]=2 τ∗
ic0(τ∗




and the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of the principal is V (τ∗) − 2τ∗c0(τ∗
i).
(ii) For any vector τ∗
i,τ∗
j,... ,p a y o ﬀs and expected wages are the same under simultaneous
and sequential expertise.
Proposition 2 shows that the costs of expertise are independent of the timing of expertise.
Besides a possible preference to receive information early, there exist other factors that inﬂuence
the timing of expertise. When the loss of the principal is a function of the action11 ,s e q u e n t i a l
expertise can be optimal even when c00 < 0.C o n s i d e raﬁrm which has to decide whether or not
to invest in a project. The project is proﬁtable only if the state is above some threshold. In this
case, it can be optimal that the agent initially exerts only little eﬀort and acquires only general
information. Only if the ﬁrst assessment is not too negative, it is worthwhile to ask an agent to
acquire more detailed information.12
Ad i ﬀerent reason for sequential expertise or contracting with multiple agents is that it is not
always possible to write contracts where transfers are contingent on the realized state. If the
state is realized at some distant point in the future, it might be necessary to pay the agent before
the state is realized. Additionally, in some situations, the realized state is not veriﬁable while
messages are. Consider an expert who is asked to estimate how many people will be killed by a
disease. While the actual number of deaths might not be veriﬁable, an estimate is a number that
the expert announces and there is no reason why it should not be possible to contract on this
11 In the model above, we assume that the loss function is symmetric and that it depends only on the distance
between action and state. This assumption simpliﬁes the proof of uniqueness because it guarantees that ∂2V
∂2τ < 0.
Except to ensure uniqueness, there are no other reasons for this assumption.
12 Whenever τ∗ > 0, the agent earns some rent. If there is only one agent, the agent takes into account that only
a message that induces an optimistic belief guarantees that the principal wants to acquire additional information
which generates additional rents for the agent. To ensure that the agent reveals the signal, the wage has to be
adjusted. Speciﬁcally, for low signals (where the principal does not ask the agent to acquire additional information)
the wage is higher compared to the contract in Proposition 1. The agent’s concern about future rents makes initial
information acquisition more costly and, therefore, leads to ineﬃciencies. If there are many agents, the source of
the ineﬃciencies disappears. After every message, the principal decides whether she should ask another agent to
acquire additional information.
20announcement.
When the state is either not veriﬁable or is not observed before wages are paid, the contract
cannot specify wages as a function of the realized state. In order to provide the agent with
incentives to acquire information, the principal has to contract with a second agent.13 Since
signals are correlated with the true state, information about the signal of a second agent can be
used to provide the ﬁrst agent with incentives to exert eﬀort. The cost to provide an agent with
incentives to exert eﬀort depends on the precision of the signal of the other agent. The less precise
the signal of the other agent, the more expensive it is to provide an agent with incentives to exert
eﬀort. In the limit as the precision of the signal of the other agent goes to inﬁnity, the principal
is in the same situation as in Proposition 1 where state is observable.
We do not consider collusion. Collusion is a less severe problem than one would expect. Under
the equilibrium contract in Proposition 3, at most one agent receives a positive transfer (except
if both send the message m = µ). If side payments between agents are not possible, the principal
can prevent collusion by setting the wage for m = µ to zero.
Suppose that the principal can contract with two agents and let i,j denote the agents. Addi-
t i o n a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tc000 ≥ 0.14
Proposition 3 (i) If transfers cannot be conditioned on the state, the principal contracts with


















The agents accept and send the message m(s)=s.












and chooses action a =
13 In our model, the principal has no private information. Prendergast (1993) analyzes a situation where the
state is not observed and where the principal receives a signal about the true state that is her private information.
14 This assumption is only necessary to derive an explicit expression for the equilibrium precision. Proposition
3(i)-(ii) do not change if c000 < 0. However, if c000 < 0, it is possible that the principal oﬀers diﬀerent contracts to









(iii) In equilibrium, τ∗
i = τ∗




























with τ∗ = τ∗
i + τ∗
j.






. The expected equilibrium payoﬀ of















and the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of the principal is







Contrary to common intuition, agents are not rewarded if they conﬁrm the recommendation
of each other. If both agents receive the same signal, they send the same message. Except if
s = µ, agents receive a wage of zero. An agent is rewarded only if the other agent received a signal
which is more extreme. The reason for this result is similar to the reasoning behind Proposition 1.
Under the optimal contract, the agent reveals his signal. For each signal si, the principal decides
for which realizations of the other signal sj agent i is rewarded. It is optimal to reward the agent
when the relative eﬀect of an increase of the precision on the likelihood that the other agent
receives a certain signal, is maximal. If agent i observes si, it is optimal to reward him when sj





For a given precision, agents earn a higher rent when the state is not observable or not veriﬁable.
In this case, wages depend on the signal of the other agent. Since agents are protected by zero
liability, the expected wage that is necessary to implement a certain precision, increases in the
variance of the signal of the other agent.
6. Conclusion
It is common that decision makers ask experts to acquire additional information and to recom-
mend an action. When information acquisition is delegated, the problem arises how to align the
22incentives for information acquisition and for truthful information revelation. This paper analyzes
the optimal design of contracts that provide incentives to acquire and reveal information.
We show that it is in general not optimal to reward the expert when his recommendation is
conﬁrmed by the facts. Under the optimal contract, the expert is (at least sometimes) rewarded
when his recommendation turns out to be wrong but is not rewarded when the recommendation
was correct. When the signal of the expert and the state are normally distributed, the expert
is rewarded when the state is equal to his signal. The reason for this surprising result is that
it is optimal to reward the expert when the relative eﬀect of an increase of the precision on the
likelihood that a certain state is realized, is maximal.
While it runs against common intuition to reward an expert when his recommendation was in-
correct but not when it was correct, it also seems to contradict the observation that many experts
are rewarded when their recommendation is conﬁrmed. We show that incomplete information
about the expert’s cost to exert eﬀort can explain why many experts are rewarded if their recom-
mendations are conﬁrmed. When the principal knows the expert’s cost to exert eﬀort, she also
knows the equilibrium precision of the expert’s signal. In this case, the revelation of the signal is
equivalent to the recommendation of an action. When there is incomplete information about the
expert’s cost to exert eﬀort, a recommendation contains more information than the revelation of
the private information. On the other hand, if the expert recommends an action and is rewarded
if the recommendation is conﬁrmed, he has less incentives to increase the precision of his signal.
When there is a lot of uncertainty about the cost to exert eﬀort, the ﬁrst eﬀect (more precise
information) dominates the second (less incentives).
One advantage of the model is that it generates explicit solutions. This allows to analyze the
optimal organization of expertise. We show that the cost of expertise is exclusively determined by
the cost to acquire information. The optimal number of agents depends on the cost of information
acquisition. Only if the marginal cost of precision increases, the costs of expertise exhibit disec-
onomies of scale and it is optimal to contract with as many agents as possible. In many situations,
23it is possible to gather information either sequentially or simultaneously. We show that regardless
of the cost function, the timing of expertise does not aﬀect the payoﬀs and, therefore, does not
aﬀect the equilibrium amount of information that is acquired. Finally, we analyze the optimal
contract when the realized state is not observable or not veriﬁable. In this case, the principal
contracts with two agents and the wage depends on the reports of both agents. Similar to the
case where the state is observable, an agent is not rewarded if his report is conﬁrmed by the other
agent. Instead, an agent is rewarded if the other agent reports a signal which is more extreme.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
If the principal learns the signal s and precision τ, her posterior belief is that x is distributed






and her posterior mean is E[x]=
τs+νµ
τ+ν .L e tqp denote the





Write the ﬁrst-order-condition as
Z a
−∞
l0 (|a − x|)qp(x|s,τ)dx −
Z ∞
a
l0 (|a − x|)qp(x|s,τ)dx =0 (A1)
Since qP is normal, qp(E[x]−4|s,τ)=qp(E[x]+4|s,τ). Hence, eqn.(A1) holds at a = E[x].T o
see that a = E[x] is the absolute minimum of the expected loss, let 4 = a − E[x].R e w r i t et h e
ﬁrst-order-condition in eqn.(A1) as
E[x]+4 Z
−∞
l0 (|E[x]+4 − x|)qp(x|s,τ)dx −
∞ Z
E[x]+4
l0 (|E[x]+4 − x|)qp(x|s,τ)dx =0 (A2)




l0 (|E[x]+4 − x1|) · (qp(x1|s,τ) − qp(x2|s,τ))dx1 (A3)
For 4 < 0, |E[x] − x1| > |E[x] − x2| and since qp is normal, qp(x1|s,τ) <q p(x2|s,τ) and eqn.(A3)
is negative. Similarly, for 4 > 0, |E[x] − x1| < |E[x] − x2| and, therefore, qp(x1|s,τ) >q p(x2|s,τ)
and eqn.(A3) is positive. Hence, a = E[x] minimizes the principal’s loss.




∂τ is deﬁned as the marginal change in the principal’s payoﬀ given that the message
reveals the signal.























At the optimal action, ∂V
∂a =0 .N o t et h a tV is a function of |x − a| but not of x. Therefore, V is
independent of s. Hence,
R
l(|x − a|)q(x|s,τ)dx is independent of s and, therefore, the last term















From Lemma 1, a = E[x].S i n c el is symmetric around a with a = E[x] and q is symmetric around














































ψ(s)f(s,τ)ds. By same reasoning as above, since a = E[x],t h e






























(τ+ν)2 − 2 1
(τ+ν)(x − E[x])2 +( x − E[x])4
´
q(x|s,τ)dx.O f c o u r s e ,
R
(x − E[x])2q(x|s,τ)dx
is the variance of x given s and is equal to 1
(τ+ν). Similar,
R
(x − E[x])4q(x|s,τ)dx is the
fourth centered moment of a normal distribution and is equal to 3σ4 with σ2 = 1









2(τ+ν)2 which is, of course, the same
as
R 1
2(τ+ν)2q(x|s,τ)dx. Hence, if l is constant, d2V
d2τ =0 . To show that d2V






















> 0. Note that principal chooses
a = E[x].S i n c e l0 > 0, for any x ∈ Iτ, l(|x − a|) is smaller than l(|x − a|) for x/ ∈ Iτ. Hence,
d2V
d2τ < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) The contract in Proposition 1 was derived under the restriction that all signals are revealed.
For a given precision, V is maximal if all signals are revealed. For a given expected wage, the
contract in Proposition 1 maximizes the incentive to exert eﬀort (i.e., the precision). Since all
signals are revealed, the contract in Proposition 1 is optimal.
We show ﬁrst that the agent announces the signal, i.e., that m∗(s)=s.S i n c ew(m,x)=0if
m 6= x, eqn.(1) can be rewritten as
26max
m q(m|s,τ) · w(m,m) (A5)
Substituting for q and w shows that the ﬁrst-order condition that corresponds to eqn.(A5)
holds with equality at m = s. The second-order condition is satisﬁed. Hence the agent announces
the signal. Since the agent is risk-neutral, the wage is unique up to randomization, i.e., given
signal s and optimal message m∗(s)=s, the expected wage E[w] is unique.
It remains to show that the agent accepts the contract. Eqn.(5) can be rewritten as E[w]=
2τ∗c0(τ∗).F r o m c(0) = 0 and c00 ≥ 0 follows that c(τ∗) ≤ τ∗c0(τ∗). Hence, at the equilibrium,
E[w]− c(τ∗) > 0 and the agent accepts the contract.




(iii) There exists a unique τ∗ that maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the agent. This follows
from
∂E[w]
∂τ = c0(τ∗) and E[w]=K
√
τ (eqn.(6)).
There exists a unique τ∗ that maximizes the payoﬀ of the principal. The principal maximizes
V −E[w].W ec a nw r i t eE[w] implicitly as a function of the precision τ∗ that the principal wants




=2 c0(τ∗)+2 τ∗c00(τ∗) (A6)
and, therefore, chooses E[w] (i.e. chooses k) such that E[w]=2 τ∗c0(τ∗). Uniqueness of τ∗ follows
from ∂2V
∂2τ < 0 ( L e m m aA 1 )a n dt h ef a c tt h a tt h eR H So fe q n . ( A 6 )i si n c r e a s i n gi nτ.
(iv) Eqn.(5) can be written as E[w]=2 τ∗c0(τ∗). The equilibrium payoﬀs follow immediately.
Result 1 The principal implements the same eﬀort level regardless whether the signal is veri-
ﬁable or not.
27Proof: If the signal is observed, the wage can be conditioned on x,s, and m.S i n c em does
not contain any additional information, we can wlog. restrict attention to wages schedules that
depend only on x and s. If the wage depends only on s, the agent is only rewarded if s = µ and
at the equilibrium precision ν
2τ(τ+ν)E[w]=c0(τ).S i n c e ν
2τ(τ+ν) < 1
2τ, this cannot be optimal.
If the wage depends on s and x, the agent chooses eﬀort to maximize
ZZ
w(s,x)q(x|s,τ)dxf(s,τ)ds − c(τ)










Given any expected wage payment, the incentive to exert eﬀort is maximal if w(s,x)=0if s 6= x
and w(s,x) ≥ 0 if s = x. Hence, the f.o.c. can be written as 1
2τ E[w]=c0(τ) which is the same as
i nt h ec a s ew h e r et h es i g n a li su n o b s e r v a b l e .
Result 2 The convexity of the wage is increasing in the precision of the prior: w
00
w0 increases
(decreases) in ν for m>µ(m<µ ).
Proof: The result follows immediately from the expression for w(m,x).
Result 3 The expected wage that is necessary to implement a given eﬀort does not depend on
the precision of the prior.
Proof: Since w(m,x)=0for m 6= x, eqn.(5) can be rewritten as 1
2τ∗E[w]=c0(τ∗).T h i s
proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) If the messages of all agents reveal the signal, the precision of




τ∗+ν . Signals contain noisy
information about the state. Since the state is observed, the principal cannot gain from making
the wages dependent on the signals of other agents. Therefore, contracts have the same form as
in Proposition 1.
28Let E[wi] be the expected wage of agent i.A s s h o w n a b o v e :E[wi]=2 τ∗
ic0(τ∗
i).T h e n n∗
follows immediately. For each agent, the principal chooses the equilibrium precision to minimize
the sum of expected wages. Then τ∗
i = τ∗
N if c00 > 0 and τ∗
i = τ∗ if c00 < 0 follow immediately. If




i = τ∗ and that τ∗
i ≥ 0 for all i.
Note that ∂V


























N (if c00 > 0)o rt h a t
P ∂τ∗
i
∂τ∗ =1and c00 =0 .
(ii) Under simultaneous expertise, the principal oﬀers the same contract as in Proposition
1. Under sequential expertise, the second agent knows the contract and the message of the ﬁrst










. Hence, the optimal contract for the second agent is the same contract as




1+ν and that ν is replaced with τ∗
1 + ν.A s
shown in Proposition 1, the expected wage depends only on the implemented precision but not
on µ and ν. Hence, the expected wage of the second agent is the same under simultaneous and
under sequential expertise. From induction follows that for arbitrary vector τ∗
i,τ∗
j,... ,p a y o ﬀsa n d
expected wages under simultaneous and sequential expertise are the same
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
(i) The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Using the revelation principle, let
m∗(s)=s.L e twi(si,s j) be the wage of agent i when the signals are si and sj.A g e n ti chooses
eﬀort to maximize
ZZ
wi(si,s j)q(sj|si,τi,τj)dsjf(si,τi)dsi − c(τi)
where τi and τj are the precision of the signals and q(sj|si,τi,τj) is the conditional density of sj.
The signals are normal with mean x.G i v e nsi,w eh a v eE[x|si]=
τisi+νµ
τi+ν . From the perspective
of agent i, the signal of agent j is normal with mean
τisi+νµ
τi+ν . Conditional on si, the variance of sj



















¶2 τj(τi + ν)































(τi + ν)2 wqdsjfdsi (A7)
The principal decides for which signal sj agent i is rewarded. Hence, the principal maximizes
∂E[wi]
∂τi with respect to sj. Eqn.(A7) is maximal at sj = si +
ν(si−µ)
τj .L e te sj(si)=si +
ν(si−µ)
τj .






2τi(τj + τi + ν)
¸
w(si,e sj(si))q(e sj(si)|si,τi,τj)de sj(si)fdsi
=
τj + ν
2τi(τj + τi + ν)
E[wi] (A8)
Note that if τj = ∞, the signal of agent j reveals the state and the contract is the same as if the








q(e sj(mi)|si,τi,τj) · wi(mi,e sj(mi))












After substituting for q and solving the diﬀerential equation for wi,w eh a v e











and, of course, wi(mi,m j)=0whenever mj 6= e sj(mi).
30Whenever τ∗ > 0, the agent earns rent and, therefore, accepts the contract.
(ii) Follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that m(s)=s.
(iii) The principal chooses τi,τj to minimize E[wi]+E[wj] given that τi + τj = τ∗.A tt h e
precision that maximizes the payoﬀ of the agent, we have
∂E[w]
∂τ = c0(τ). From eqn.(A8) follows
that E[wi]=
2τi(τj+τi+ν)
τj+ν c0(τi). Hence, the principal minimizes
2τi(τj + τi + ν)
τj + ν
c0(τi)+
2τj(τj + τi + ν)
τi + ν
c0(τj) s.t. τi + τj = τ∗ (A9)































(iv) Follows immediately from substitution.
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